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Manufacturing Magic and
Computational Creativity
Howard Williams* and Peter W. McOwan
School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
This paper describes techniques in computational creativity, blending mathematical
modeling and psychological insight, to generate new magic tricks. The details of an
explicit computational framework capable of creating new magic tricks are summarized,
and evaluated against a range of contemporary theories about what constitutes a creative
system. To allow further development of the proposed systemwe situate this approach to
the generation of magic in the wider context of other areas of application in computational
creativity in performance arts. We show how approaches in these domains could be
incorporated to enhance future magic generation systems, and critically review possible
future applications of such magic generating computers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This review focusses on the theoretical context of a conceptual framework, proposed by Williams
and McOwan (2014), for the creation and optimization of magic tricks, based on observations
of psychological phenomena that inform computational search and optimization techniques. An
overview of how computational systems can, and do, contribute to human creative endeavors
in many fields will be provided, along with suggestions for how work in these diverse areas
can potentially further inform automated magic trick creation. Additionally, the degree to which
computational systems can be viewed as creative entities in their own right will be discussed. A brief
overview of psychological research that may be useful for new automated magic design systems
is also given, leading to a discussion of the areas of future work, and potential new tricks, that
lie ahead.
The framework detailed in Williams and McOwan (2014) outlines a set of conceptual tools that
allow for a systematic approach to understanding and subsequently designing magic tricks, with
the creative assistance of various computational systems.
Magic, as a performance art, has been around for thousands of years; Christopher and
Christopher (1996) provides an excellent history. The performance of any magic trick is vital to
its success. However, the design of the trick itself—the set of methods, and physical objects (props
and gimmicks) that must be deployed for a strong effect in the spectator (a seemingly magical
event)—is equally important. The perception of a trick by a spectator can be influenced by both of
these factors, and by the spectator themselves. For a trick to have a strong magical effect there must
be a cohesive interaction between these three elements: a trick’s designer, performer, and spectator.
As Ortiz (1994) notes, a magical effect occurs in the mind of a spectator. For example, Lamont
and Wiseman (1999) describe one of the most commonly performed magical effects, the vanish:
most people will have seen someone make a coin vanish from their hand. This is one of a number
of basic magical effects that magicians are able to achieve; others include, appearance: an object
seems to impossibly come into existence; transposition: an object miraculously moves in space;
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transformation: an object is changed to another form; restoration:
a previously destroyed object is reconstituted; penetration: the
impenetrable is breached. An object, in this context, can be
a physical object, or a piece of information—for example, a
playing card, or a spectator’s date of birth. Essentially, an effect
is an event that the observer perceives as being something
outside of the normal physical rules of the world; see Lamont
and Wiseman (1999). Further useful descriptions of the basic
effects achieved by magicians is provided in Smith et al.
(2016).
Often, effects will be achieved by influencing perception, via a
sleight of hand, misdirection, or a device utilized by the magician.
Whatever particular approach is used to create a specific
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Influencing perception
The human perceptual system can be manipulated and affected by both
external physical, and internal psychological, processes to produce magical
effects, and there exist optimal configurations of these factors that give rise to
better magic experiences.
effect, the mechanism is traditionally referred to as the method;
Ortiz (1994) provides detailed discussions of methods for magic
tricks.
Magic tricks have, throughout history, been designed by
ingenious human inventors, such as Robert Harbin, U.F.
Grant, Fred Braue, Alex Elmsley, and many more; knowledge
of fundamental techniques is passed between magicians and
designers, under a widely observed code of secrecy forbidding
the dissemination of information to the uninitiated. These
human trick designers tend to evaluate the quality of their
creations through informal analysis and intuition (which they are
exceptionally good at). See Rissanen et al. (2013) and Rissanen
et al. (2014), for qualitative studies that describe some of these
types of approaches.
However, sometimes a trick’s design (and subsequent
evaluation of that design) will present problems that are
challenging for even the most ingenious of humans using
informal methods. The dissection and rigorous scientific analysis
of the various factors necessary for a trick to be successful would
surely provide benefits to a trick designer similar to those reaped
by creative humans in fields more historically closely aligned
with science and engineering, such as architecture and software
design. Further, and critical to this review, a formal analysis
of magic tricks allows for the possibility of a computational
system to be imagined that can aid human beings with the
task of designing magic tricks. Fortunately, magic has been
a subject of scientific interest for some time—the application
of psychological theories to magic was investigated by Triplett
(1900) over a hundred years ago. It is difficult to determine the
earliest rigorous scientific study of magic, though Jastrow (1897)
produced investigations in this area in 1897. Interestingly, both
these studies describe magic’s efficacy as being closely related
to its narrative powers: heightening the psychological impact
of the magical effect by building to its climax, using various
psychological methods along the way; for example, establishing
the magician as the wielder of extraordinary powers by way
of a number of small magical effects. These types of concepts
can be difficult to naively formalize from a computational
perspective; specific data must be generated in a form that can
be meaningfully manipulated by a computer, with measurable
outputs that can be further subject to scientific evaluation.
There have been a number of attempts to create a set of
scientifically sound principles to describe the techniques involved
in magic and conjuring. Binet (1894) used a chronophotographic
gun (enabling the rapid recording of sequential photographic
frames) to investigate sleights of hand used by magicians,
revealing previously unknown perceptual mechanisms. Nardi
(1984) approached magic tricks from a sociological and
social psychological perspective, analysing the similarities and
differences between amagic performance and interactions during
normal life—the work shows how a magician is able to construct
an alternate version of reality by bracketing off parts of the
performance, and setting up various visible and concealed
“tracks" of events, in order to control and undermine people’s
expectations, and their normal rational view of the world.
Hyman (1989) analyzed the psychology of deception, providing
a historical overview, along with suggested categorizations and
examples of the various types of deception. Later, Wiseman
(1996) laid out some foundational works toward a psychological
theory of deception, before Lamont and Wiseman (1999) made
an effort, supported by interviews with leading magicians,
to explain the theoretical and psychological underpinnings of
conjuring tricks, outlining a number of rules and fundamental
techniques that can be used for effective performance.
Critically, Kuhn et al. (2008) started work toward postulating
a general science of magic, a way of investigating magical
effects from a scientific perspective, categorizing and formalizing
the various physical and psychological processes involved. This
kind of effort provides concrete and measurable theories as
to the general nature of human perception and cognition as
it relates to magic tricks. Further, Rensink and Kuhn (2015a)
have summarized how magic tricks themselves have been
evaluated scientifically. They remark that the use of appropriately
controlled experiments to rigorously determine, for example,
that a particular effect does or does not exist, may enable
the underlying mechanisms, psychological or otherwise, to
be described. An example of this type of detailed scientific
investigation into magic is how Parris et al. (2009) used neuro-
imaging techniques to show that while perceiving a magic
trick, certain brain regions associated with the detection of
conflict and the implementation of cognitive control were
more highly activated in the left hemisphere—further, viewing
of magic tricks caused greater activations in these regions
than viewings of surprising events (the former differentiated
from magical events by the imposition of a magic condition:
that a cause-effect relationship is violated); this suggests that
the brain regions identified play a special role in causality
processing, and constitute an element of the neurobiology of
disbelief.
There are opposing views as to the usefulness of studying
magic from a scientific perspective, or framing a theory of
magic in scientific terms: Lamont et al. (2010) suggest that it
is in itself an illusion that a science of magic exists, arguing
that the link between theories of conjuring, and scientific
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theories of psychology, have been exaggerated. More recently,
Lamont (2015) argues against the possibility of discovering the
kind of natural taxonomies of magic tricks, see Kuhn et al.
(2014), or methods, see Rensink and Kuhn (2015a), that have
been proposed as worthy of investigation. Part of Lamont’s
argument appears to rely on the idea that different effects may
be realized using a similar method. Rensink and Kuhn (2015b)
have responded by pointing out that this type of small variation
over sets of items has not hindered other scientific endeavors of
this type, for example the categorization of animals in biology.
It seems that while varying magical effects are possible from
similarmethodological bases, this does not rule out the possibility
of stratifying the various effects and methods, including the
components of the variations, themselves. In some senses,
varying effects can be produced through the use of psychological
lenses that are applied by a magician via these subtle variations
in the method—while the method remains the same up to a
point, the final effect is determined with a small but crucial
change that alters the spectator’s perception of the events. This
does not rule out the possibility of describing the various lenses,
though may increase the difficulty of the challenge. This will
surely be an ongoing process—for example, new living organisms
are routinely observed and codified.
As mentioned, for an automated trick design system to
be built, such as that described by Williams and McOwan
(2014), it is necessary that not only are the components of
the trick understood in a formal sense, but also that the
system is designed in a way that enables the outputs to
be objectively evaluated with respect to the perceptual and
cognitive phenomena associated with a spectator’s experience
of a given trick. Regarding the former, recent work by Smith
et al. (2016) provides an example of how a magic trick may
be dissected into logical states and actions, showing how a
trick’s success depends on the construction of a type of logical
impossibility for the spectator, achieved through the use of
parallel event sequences (one for the performer, and one for
the spectator). Considering the latter, formalized psychological
research can provide reliable data about particular mental
phenomena — data sets gathered using these methods can be
integrated into computational systems formodeling perception.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Modeling perception
Human perceptual systems can be modeled mathematically and/or
computationally in order to optimize magical effects.
The data may be related to either the spectator or performer
of a magic trick, or in certain cases both, and can also
be used by a human trick designer to inform the design
process.
Designers can of course choose to deploy computers to aid
the trick design process in much the same way that writers
may use word processing software, or film makers video editing
software—for example, stage illusionist designers use computer-
aided design (CAD) packages to design large on-stage props.
However, this application of computers is superficial to the core
of the effects, being used instead to enhance the design aesthetics,
or improve ease of fabrication and construction.
Williams and McOwan (2014) have presented and
investigated a conceptual framework, for the design,
optimization, and evaluation of magic tricks that explicitly
integrates the various elements of magic discussed in
a rigorous, formalized way, including the addition of a
computational component that is intended to provide solutions
to computationally hard problems that are unavailable to human
designers. This computational component is realizable only
through the assumption, and application of, some form of a
science of magic. The role of the computer in their proposed
framework is seen to be fundamental, allowing trick designers
to move a large degree of responsibility for a trick’s core
design to the software, with the intentions of improving the
resultant effect for a spectator, and easing the designer’s task
in various ways. Further, the framework allows magic tricks
themselves to be studied from a scientific perspective. This
type of system shows the computer’s primary role to be one of
assisting design in meaningful ways. Configuring a computer
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Assisting design
Computational systems can take on areas of responsibility in the design process
of certain types of magic trick.
to perform this kind of role is neither straight forward, nor
fully realizable. Creative computers, able to specify their own
parameters in order to produce entirely novel categories of
artefacts for human consumption, are still arguably some way off.
Computers that assist the design process in a given domain (e.g.,
for manufacturing magic) in significant ways, some of which
appear to mimic aspects and outputs of human creativity, are,
however, currently feasible.
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Manufacturing magic
Configuring computational systems with empirically determined psychological
data, within a flexible and extensible conceptual framework, can successfully
produce novel magic trick designs.
2. THE BATTLE FOR COMPUTATIONAL
CREATIVITY
Building computational systems to assist with various tasks has
a rich and varied history. Early efforts in artificial intelligence
focussed on problem solving systems that, configured with a
formalized knowledge of a particular domain, would process
logical operations, via a general inference engine, over the
parameters of the domain, in an effort to find solutions to given
problems; see Newell et al. (1959). The idea was to create a
generalized, universal, problem solver, capable of solving any
problem that could be stated in formal terms. The system had
successes with relatively simple tasks, but ran up against the
difficulty of combinatorial explosion: the various ways in which a
logical system could be combined, even with only a small number
of components, became intractably large.
Knowledge based systems, built with sophisticated inference
engines, generally termed expert systems due to the extensive
input from human domain experts, provide queryable access to
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well formed knowledge bases. An early system used for medical
diagnosis, developed at Stanford University, see Buchanan and
Shortliffe (1984), while never used operationally, often performed
better than its human counterparts. Such systems, once
configured, can provide intelligent answers to varied queries,
oftenmore accurately and quickly than their human counterparts
due to their vast memory banks, and speed of processing. While
impressive, such systems are not seen as creative, in the sense
that they are not designed to output novelties, rather to locate
previously acquired knowledge efficiently.
While the framework detailed in Williams and McOwan
(2014) bears similarities to aspects of expert systems, domain
experts are consulted (magicians) and their knowledge
formalized and operated on by computers, the goals, and
therefore the implementations of the systems differ. Expert
systems aim to provide accurate and detailed answers to
queries based on existing knowledge bases, while, arguably, the
framework aims to provide a way to build systems that output
artefacts that contribute to these existing knowledge bases.
Computational creativity is the field that addresses the
challenge of building creative computational systems that output
novel artefacts. The idea, if not implementation, of creative
computers, distinct from problem solvers, or expert knowledge
systems, reaches back to the very beginnings of computing.
However, this notion of machines as creative entities in their own
right was intially met by some with scepticism. Ada Lovelace,
described as the world’s first computer programmer due to
her work detailing uses of Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine
(the first general purpose computing machine, never built),
see Babbage (1889), understood that this new machine would
be capable of creating new works of music of any degree of
complexity, but she also believed that the credit for these must
be given to the engineer that configures the machine, not the
machine itself:
The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate
anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform.
It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any
analytical relations or truths (Lovelace, 1842).
From this perspective, the systems described in Williams and
McOwan (2014) are no more or no less creative than the people
that created them, and would be incapable, in present or future
form, of generating tricks unimagined by their authors.
Alan Turing, the originator of the modern general purpose
computer, and deep thinker on the topic of the possibility of
machine intelligence, disagreed with Lovelace on this matter:
A variant of Lady Lovelace’s objection states that a machine can
“never do anything really new.” This may be parried for amoment
with the saw, “There is nothing new under the sun.” Who can be
certain that “original work” that he has done was not simply the
growth of the seed planted in him by teaching, or the effect of
following well-known general principles (Turing, 1950).
Viewed in this way, the systems in Williams and McOwan (2014)
may be categorized as formalized creative entities, generating
novel artefacts in a similar, if hugely simplified, manner to their
human counter parts.
At the crux of the argument lies the problem of understanding
what it means to perform a creative act—a difficult problem.
Boden (1998) supplies a neat summary of what lies at the source
of creative thinking:
Creativity is not a special “faculty,” nor a psychological property
confined to a tiny elite. Rather, it is a feature of human
intelligence in general. It is grounded in everyday capacities such
as the association of ideas, reminding, perception, analogical
thinking, searching a structured problem-space, and reflective
self-criticism.
Following work in Newell et al. (1963), Boden identifies
the criteria that the output of creative systems, human or
computational, must be novel (to the system itself) and useful
(evaluated as such). For example, a new, or variant of an existing,
magic trick—Boden (1998) describes three different type of
creativity that humans, or computer systems, may engage in:
1. Combinational—the novel combination of two or more
familiar ideas.
2. Exploratory—the generation of novel ideas by the exploration
of structured conceptual spaces.
3. Transformational—the transformation of one or more
dimensions of a structured conceptual space, enabling the
acquisition of previously unavailable new ideas.
Interestingly, although transformational creativity is the most
radical of the three, and likely to result in the most unexpected
new ideas, it is in fact exploratory creativity that the majority of
creative people are engaged in, as Boden (1998) describes:
Many human beings—including (for example) most professional
scientists, artists, and jazz-musicians—make a justly respected
living out of exploratory creativity. That is, they inherit an
accepted style of thinking from their culture, and then search
it, and perhaps superficially tweak it, to explore its contents,
boundaries, and potential.
We can add magic trick designers to Boden’s list of creative
human beings.
From a computational perspective, creative artefacts have
many parameters governing their perceived quality. Combining
these in an optimal way can be a difficult task for a human,
due to the large number of combinations available. The design
of some artefacts, or elements thereof, can fundamentally be
seen as a search problem—exploratory creativity. Mitchell (1998)
explains that search problems fall into three categories: locating
targets in a search space (pattern matching), optimizing a cost
function (optimization), or path planning. A cost function (or
objective function, or fitness function) is a measure of the
quality of the solution found by an optimization algorithm.
Solving a search problem, for a computer, entails traversing
either physical data stores of some kind, or virtual spaces as
defined by a mathematical function. Systems built using cost
functions will often have soft and hard constraints imposed upon
their outputs—hard constraints being those that define invalid
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 855
Williams and McOwan Manufacturing Magic
solutions in a search space, while soft constraints are those aspects
of the solution that should ideally be maximized, or minimized,
as appropriate.
In a search space, there may be valid solutions that are not
in fact the best possible solution in the entire space; these are
local optima. The best possible solutions in the search space are
referred to as the global optima. Optimization is the effort to
find parameter values, within a set of constraints, that produce
an optimal solution to a particular problem. Some optimization
methods are able to guarantee returning global optima, though
may not be able to do so in a practical amount of time, depending
on the particular domain.
Much work in the field of computational creativity uses search
and optimization techniques to explore controlled problem
domains (parameter spaces) in search of novel and optimal
artefacts (pieces of music, paintings, magic tricks, etc). There
has been an effort in Wiggins G.A. (2006), Wiggins G. (2006)
to formalize Boden’s notions of creativity in to a computational
framework, noting the similarities between exploratory creativity
and many computational search methods, in order to better
explore the conceptual underpinnings and try to lay out a
way forward that could encompass the automation of creative
acts. Colton et al. (2011) build on these ideas and present a
computational creativity theory that contains both a descriptive
model of creative acts (that they term FACE), and a descriptive
model of the impact that computationally creative acts may have
(termed IDEA). For example, they built systems to generate visual
art, then evaluated the impact these works had on people that
knew they had been generated computationally.
In Williams and McOwan (2014), the authors present systems
that would appear to be engaged in just this kind of exploratory
creativity; systems that trawl search spaces looking for novel
configurations of data that represent new magic tricks. On the
surface, these systems may appear to be engaging in creative acts;
their outputs are certainly novel. To further explore this notion, it
is necessary to place these systems within a wider context. Colton
and Wiggins (2012) summarizes seminal works in the field of
computational creativity, and provides a brief history of the topic,
along with a working definition of what it is:
The philosophy, science and engineering of computational
systems which, by taking on particular responsibilities, exhibit
behaviors that unbiased observers would deem to be creative.
They contrast such systems with those produced in the
HCI (human-computer interaction) field, see Shneiderman
(2007), that assist human beings to generate creative work;
for example Photoshop (visual art), Max/MSP (new media),
AutoCAD (engineering/architectural/product design), Cubase
(music), Eclipse (software development) etc. Themain difference,
they argue, is that computationally creative systems take on
responsibilities for the creation of artefacts that HCI systems
generally do not. They also introduce the idea of an unbiased
assessor to fairly evaluate the outputs of computationally creative
systems. They note the readiness with which human beings
attribute creativity to the programmer and not the machine.
Interestingly, they see computational creativity as moving away
from a problem solving paradigm, the most common approach
in the wider AI field, toward:
...an artefact generation paradigm, where the automation of an
intelligent task is seen as an opportunity to produce something
of cultural value (Colton and Wiggins, 2012).
Creative computational systems have been implemented in many
fields. A detailed history is given in Cardoso et al. (2009). The
systems developed in each area are often radically different to one
another in the approach they take to generating novel and useful
outputs, using different kinds of data structures, and applying
different algorithms to the problems at hand, tailoring each to
the specific conceptual space. Magic, as a craft, synthesizes many
different types of creative endeavor to produce a final trick.
What follows is a short review of some of the important
advances made in computational creativity, seen to be the natural
domain into which the framework under discussion falls, rather
than a comprehensive overview of the state of the art, along with
a brief discussion of how these areas may feed in to further work
on producing autonomous systems for magic trick creation.
2.1. Design Science
Cross (2001), provides a discussion of the history of attempts to
“scientise" design from the 1960’s on, and makes the distinction
between design as a discipline, as a way for humans to engage
in designing successfully, and design as a science in which
the design methods are formalized, with a hope that works
of art and design may be produced in an objective manner.
Various applications have sprung from this systematic approach
to design, including automating information sytems, see Hevner
and Chatterjee (2010), architectural layouts, see Michalek et al.
(2002), and combinational circuit design, see Coello et al. (2000).
The framework of Williams and McOwan (2014) makes some
first steps at formalizing an automated design methodology as
applied specifically to the automated generation of artefacts
for use in magic tricks. The use of empirical psychological
data is seen as critical to the creation of successful designs for
magic. Further developments and refinements in this area should
certainly be fruitful, in particular for the design of the physical
items involved in much magic (props and gimmicks).
2.2. Language, Stories, and Poetry
Poetry, perhaps the most specifically human of all the arts, has
been subjected to a computational approach for its generation.
Natural language, particularly of the ambiguous kind typically
used in poetry, and magic performances, is very difficult terrain
for a computer. Gervás developed a computer system, ASPERA,
to compose formal Spanish poetry, see Gervás (2000). Dìaz-
Agudo et al. (2002) describes a similar system, COLIBRI. These
expert systems (a system that relies heavily on the formalization
of knowledge from domain experts) use case based reasoning (the
generation of solutions to problems based on known solutions
to similar problems) to generate poetic versions of inputted text
by querying a database of previously written poems. Oliveira
(2009) provides a more comprehensive overview of the various
approaches to automatic poetry generation.
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Sardonicus, described in Veale and Hao (2007), is also
a case based system; it constructs a database of similes for
adjectives from data on the internet, which is then used by a
system named Aristotle to suggest new metaphors for provided
descriptive goals.
TheMINSTREL system, described in Turner (1994), generates
short stories of reasonable quality (given their origin); the system
is based on the idea of separating out, and formalizing, the goals
of the characters in a story from the narrative goals of the author.
An intelligent search procedure is performed on a database of
known previous answers to the problems that meeting these goals
throws up, resulting in novel stories.
These types of systems can plausibly be deployed for
generating and integrating narratives for use in magic tricks.
For example, in Williams and McOwan (2014), the tricks
described each use a narrative to maximize the impact of the
effect; automating and/or optimizing the narrative generation
process is an unexplored area, and one likely to throw light
on the psychological processes at work in human observer’s of
magic tricks with relation to language and its ambiguities and
nuances.
2.3. Comedy
It is well known that magic and humor go naturally together;
magicians are, however, wary of over using humor during their
routines for fear of reducing the impact of the magical effect.
This is an obvious area for optimization—using computational
systems to generate humorous sections of a trick may allow for
the optimization of both the jokes themselves, and for the timing
and frequency of their deployment, and how this may impact the
overall effect.
Humor is often attempted via computers: the JAPE (Joke
Analysis and Production Engine) system, see Binsted et al. (1997),
was an early successful development, capable of generating
puns that young children found humorous by analysing and
formalizing the structure of certain types of jokes and finding
a way to score new candidate jokes for meaning and humor.
The JAPE system is also interesting because the authors used
empirical methods to evaluate the quality of the creative artefacts
that it produced; the jokes it produced were consistently
rated, by children, on a par with human created jokes of a
similar kind.
A system that incorporates some kind of formal
understanding of how much, or what kind, of humor is
best deployed in a magic trick can be imagined.
2.4. Visual Art
Perhaps the most successful and controversial creative system
developed is the Painting Fool from Colton Colton (2012),
an AI project with the aim of one day being taken seriously
as an autonomously creative visual artist. The Painting Fool
is a hybrid system, using various techniques to automatically
generate the elements of a picture. The project also investigates
the sociological implications of the idea of computational artists,
and the impact the created artefacts have with the general public.
This aspect of the work, its impact with the public, is of particular
relevance to magic. As Williams and McOwan (2014) note, the
introduction of technological objects into a magic performance
runs the risk of removing some of the magicians narrative tools
and performance devices necessary to the successful creation of
a sense of wonder for the spectator. Revealing that the trick has,
at least in part, been created by a computer, increases this risk.
There are many factors to consider, and avenues to research.
The creation of visual artefacts has an obvious link to magic,
which often has a visual effect at its core. The significant successes
creating visual art computationally provide a rich source of
knowledge about how imagery and its perception by a spectator
can be manipulated toward certain desired effects—a natural
domain for magic.
2.5. Music
Rigorously defining the various facets of the perception of music,
from a psychological perspective, is difficult. The perceptual and
cognitive processes at work while a magic trick is observed
are similarly nebulous. Analysing computational systems that
produce music in a creative way, or otherwise, can throw light
on ways in which systems may be structured for the production
of magic tricks. Methods for evaluating the eventual artefacts
produced by each of these types of system is critical to them
having any hope of success (creative autonomy), and is an
ongoing field of research.
Horner and Goldberg (1991), McIntyre (1994), Papadopoulos
and Wiggins (1998), and Phon-Amnuaisuk et al. (1999) all
describe Genetic Algorithms (GAs) as the core process in a
software system engineered to compose music. These systems
all computationally evaluate the quality (or, in GA terms, the
fitness) of the outputs during the iterative process of creation.
Similar approaches that instead use a human assessor, known
as Interactive GAs (IGAs), have also been developed by, among
others, Horowitz (1994), Ralley (1995), and Biles (1994). The
main limitation of this interactive approach is that a human
must assess the outputs of the system at each stage of the
evolutionary process, which is inefficient. Spector and Alpern
(1995) describes Genetic Programming (GP; the programming
code itself is evolved) methods for the creation of musical phrases
intended to respond to other phrases in jazz music. Johanson
and Poli (1998) describes GP-Music, another GP system, that
also uses automatic fitness (quality) assessors. Iliopoulos et al.
(2002) describe an evolutionary system capable of generating
musical motifs in polyphonic passages (more than one note at
any given time) to order. Chuan and Chew (2007) describe a
hybrid system (with assessments and input from both computer
systems and humans) that focusses on creating accompaniments
in a specific style.
The idea of building computer systems that first learn a model
of a particular conceptual space, for example music, and then
having them alter the model to generate new artefacts, is the
subject of a large theoretical effort by Wiggins, see Wiggins
(2012), whose work relies on Baars’ Global Workspace Theory,
see Baars (1993), as a conceptual framework, the statistical
modeling of musical perception pioneered by Pearce (2005), and
ideas from Shannon’s Information Theory; see Shannon (1948).
Being able to effectively encode the structure of a magic tricks
performance, both the qualitative and quantitative elements, so
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that it can be represented in a form suitable for manipulation
to generate new variants would be challenging. Unlike music
where large data sets, all comprising musical notes, exist, and
can be learned to extract models for music, no such common
coding or annotated data sets exists for performance. Music is
encoded note by note, but it is not clear what the resolution
of the representation of a magic performance encoding would
need to be to prove effective and be able to discriminate between
performance nuances. This could prove an interesting area for
future work.
3. CONJURING CREATIVITY: FUTURE
WORK
In the previous section we described several areas where
findings from other diverse areas of research in computational
creativity could provide fertile avenues to further enhance the
creation of new magic. In this final section we look at domains
in psychology and magic where appropriate computational
creativity frameworks could be applied.
3.1. Exploiting Computational Psychology
Magic has a wide psychological scope, that exploits many facets
of human perceptual and cognitive systems; Rensink and Kuhn
(2015a) provide an overview of many principles and parameters
that have been investigated in this area. Here, we highlight some
areas of psychological phenomena that may be most relevant
for use in computational systems configured to generate magical
effects.
Our brain’s expectations of the perceived world plays a large
part in what we consciously experience, even when it differs from
the actual reality of the situation. Triplett (1900) and later Kuhn
and Land (2006) developed and studied a vanishing ball illusion
whereby a ball is tossed in the air several times by a magician,
before it appears to suddenly vanish in mid-air during the final
(simulated) toss. Latterly, Kuhn and Rensink (2016) show how
studying magical effects, specifically the vanishing ball illusion,
can shine a light on cognitive processes at work during their
viewing; for example, predictive visual processes, and the effect
of long term knowledge, and exemplars from the immediate
past, on perception. Work done by Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2006) highlights the apparent similarities between probabilistic
statistical reasoning, and the ways in which the human brain
operates—this type of mathematical modeling of expectation by
the brain should have a natural application in computational
magic trick optimization processes.
A magician’s success in secretly changing or moving objects
during a performance may depend largely on their ability to
surreptitiously move their spectator’s attention around the scene
they have created for their trick, be it a stage, or a deck of
cards in their hands. Attention is seen in Desimone and Duncan
(1995) as the process that enables our brains to selectively
filter large amounts of incoming perceptual information, and to
make sense of and manipulate our environment in advantageous
ways. This sophisticated and complex process can also lead to
perceptual errors, such as important visual information being
ignored in certain circumstances. The computational modeling
of visual attention is a large topic area, see Itti and Koch (2001);
incorporating specific instances of these types of models for use
in magic trick optimization would appear feasible.
Change Blindness, the inability to detect large changes
in visual scenes without consciously attending to them, is
a relatively large topic area that has been critically assessed
in Simons (2000). Rensink et al. (1997) shows how the
human perceptual system does not form complete detailed
representations of visual scenes, and that attention is the crucial
element required to perceive changes in an environment under
normal viewing conditions. To determine this experimentally,
Rensink uses a flicker paradigm: people are shown two images,
A and A’, with a blank screen interleaved between them for a
short period. A and A’ are identical, except for some small, or
large, changes made by the researchers to A’. People struggle to
identify even very large changes made to the scenes depicted
in A’. Interestingly, Verma and McOwan (2005) has shown
how computational models of saliency perception, coupled with
computational optimization techniques, allow for the semi-
automated generation of visual stimuli that predict change
detection performance. The study shows that low level saliency
is a reasonable predictor of change detection performance
in comparison with high level measures (e.g., mouse-click
densities). It should be possible to harness these predictive
models for computational magic trick optimization.
Attention can be manipulated by perhaps the most important
tool available to a magician: misdirection—in one sense, the art
of moving an observer’s attention away from a point of interest,
allowing the magician to perform a move of some kind (slipping
something into a pocket, swapping a card, etc). Misdirection
is not well understood. Kuhn and Martinez (2011) provide an
overview of the current thinking, from both magicians and
scientists, on the role of misdirection in magic, and explanations
of the basic principles at work. Kuhn et al. (2014) provide
an extensive taxonomy of misdirection in magic, based on the
perceptual and cognitive mechanisms involved.
There is work to be done to formalize and fully understand
all the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms at work in
misdirection, though there exists much that is of interest
to those wishing to understand misdirection from both a
scientific and magical perspective. Formalizing this knowledge
computationally would provide a great deal of predictive power
for generating new magical effects.
3.2. Conjuring Up New Tricks
In stage magic, the perceptual effects of shading on perceived
depth or shape form an arsenal of methods to fool audiences into
seeing as normal and innocent configurations that in fact conceal
the method. Barnhart (2010) describes how magicians routinely
exploit gestalt principles in these types of stage magic. Often, in
stage magic that involves a human assistant, the assistant’s body is
worked into a position that is physically possible, but unexpected.
This is the basis of a number of classical stage illusions. Evaluating
the range of positions a body can take with a reasonable degree
of comfort and having these rated by observers on the basis of
plausibility would provide the basic data for later optimization.
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Similarly the use of, and optimization of, relevant optical
illusions suggests itself; for example, the use of beveled sides
to obscure the actual depth of a trick’s base box, or the use of
appropriate geometric shading to make large spaces look smaller,
could be measured and encoded. Human designers currently
use software packages to model the three dimensional problems
inherent in this type of stage trick design. The addition of a more
sophisticated approach that allows for the optimization of the
various design parameters based on empirical knowledge of the
envelope of subjects perception of “normality” appears to be a
natural avenue for further research.
Marrying this type of psychological insight to modern
computational power also suggests the possibility of large
scale tricks on social media platforms. The sheer volume of
information currently available on the internet provides a ready-
made source of psychological data. Social network theory, see
Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Barabási (2002), is increasingly
well understood, from a computational, psychological, and
sociological perspective; combining these observations with
magical techniques that involve confederates and third parties
could offer many opportunities for new magic. For example,
using social media platforms on which confederates secretly
reside, in conjunction with predictive computational models
based on network theory could allow for the implementation of
a magic trick in which a spectator’s seemingly free choice (e.g., a
particular website they choose to visit at a certain time) could be
magically revealed to have been previously known.
This type of computational modeling, in which the outcome
of a psychological process is predicted and optimized, can also
be imagined being applied to lower level, even unconscious,
systems. Close up magic, that often relies on particular attributes
of the human visual system, for example through the modeling
of misdirection or sensory illusions, is a good example. There is a
body of research already available on the science of misdirection,
see Kuhn et al. (2014) and Kuhn and Martinez (2011), and
illusions, see Robinson (1998), that could be utilized and built
upon. An as yet unexplored prospect is a workable computational
model of misdirection that would enable the conception and
optimization of a large number of new tricks. This could
possibly be approached by constructing a model of visual gaze,
and a model of distraction events, allowing various tests to
be performed to verify the model, and subsequently allow the
prediction of new tricks based on the reliable manipulation of
a spectator’s attention. Beth and Ekroll (2015) provide a study
discussing the importance of timing in close up magic; it is
precisely this type of data that could be incorporated into a
concrete computational model of aspects of magical effects. Also,
at a more macro level, work by Van de Cruys et al. (2015)
exploring seemingly unconscious inferences about the state of the
world by the brain could be built into such systems.
Similarly, we can view magic tricks as an exercise in
undermining a spectator’s expectations—for example, a
performer picks up a ball and closes their fist around it, only
to later open the same fist, revealing an empty hand. It could
prove useful to explore the human brain’s processing of the
expectations of events, and coupling these observations with
probabilistic graphical methods in computer science, see Koller
and Friedman (2009), for example Bayesian Networks, to both
predict optimal physical motions/properties for use in tricks,
and to test our understanding of the particular psychological
processes at work during their viewing.
3.3. New Scientific Knowledge
The scientific study of magic is now an active field of research,
see Kuhn et al. (2008). There appear to be ways to use magic as
a psychological probe, to help understand the operation of the
human brain: for example, Rensink and Kuhn (2015a) proposes
an extensive framework for using magic to study the mind.
There may be useful research to be conducted using aspects
of the framework described in Williams and McOwan (2014)
in order to study perceptual and cognitive processes by
designing specific magical effects to probe particular perceptual
phenomena. Analysing the efficacy, or otherwise, of such effects
may illustrate underlying psychological processes—for example:
expectation (seeing what we expect to see, even if it isn’t there);
false memories; or various attention based processes.
3.4. New Interfaces Informed by Magic
Tognazzini (1993) elucidates how magical principles are at work
in computer user interfaces—the user does not see the reality of
the underlying computer, rather a form of user illusion that the
interface presents to them.
User interface design, particularly in the field of medical
devices, demands precision, simplicity, and clarity. Making
mistakes, both perceptual and cognitive, is a normal part of
everyday human activity, but for human beings operating in a
medical context making these types of errors could have serious
consequences, see Kohn et al. (2000): medical errors cost lives.
There have been efforts to engineer better, safer, medical device
interfaces, that go someway to reducing the possibility for human
error; see Zhang et al. (2003). These have often been based
on adapting user interface design methods from other fields.
Informatics has recently been used to improve processes and
outcomes in the healthcare of cancer, see Hesse et al. (2016).
Applying an optimization process such as that presented
in Williams and McOwan (2014) could prove useful in this
area of user interface design. Breaking an interface down into
both psychological and physical components should allow the
application of a similar design and optimization process used for
magic tricks, but instead of maximizing the level of deception
achieved, the number of errors produced by an interface could
be minimized.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed the development of the study of magic
as a scientific field, and the arguments for and against the
utility of such studies. The various psychological phenomena
that contribute to an effective magic performance need to be
considered if a computational system is to be able to mimic
such activity. The challenges in this are as noted significant and
it is necessary, if an explicit computational model is required,
to abstract certain tractable elements of magical theory into a
workable computational encoding.
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Following this reductionist approach, a specific case of the
use of computers as computational design aids for magic
trick designers was presented and discussed—see Williams and
McOwan (2014)—within the context of various definitions of
creativity. The creativity at work during a performance, in the
magician’s varied and subtle interactions with members of the
audience, is currently, though not necessarily, beyond the scope
of such systems.
The framework developed, which optimizes over both
physical and psychological constraints, was then considered
within the wider context of computational creativity systems
developed in other performance domains. This comparison
allows the suggestion of other elements that could be
incorporated to contribute to future magic design systems.
The fundamental creativity of such computational systems,
including those presented in Williams and McOwan (2014), was
critiqued, leading to the proposal that humans remain the main
creative force behind the novel outputs generated.
Finally, the case for the utility of using such simplified
magic frameworks as probes to study the information
processing in the human brain is made, and areas of potential
future applications, making use of explicit computational
models, capable of predicting observer performance are
described.
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